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Judge Posner, a Modern Day Chancellor in Equity: An 
Explanation of Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal 
Crafters 
Robert D. Brain* 
I. JUDGE POSNER AS CHANCELLOR 
Judge Posner is commendably candid in describing how he decided cases.1 His 
decisional philosophy gives him maximum flexibility—the flexibility to focus 
more on reaching a reasonable solution of the case before him than what precedent 
and statutory language might dictate: “I pay very little attention to legal rules, 
statutes, constitutional provisions. A case is just a dispute. The first thing you do 
is ask yourself—forget about the law—what is a sensible resolution of this 
dispute?”2 To come up with that view, Judge Posner consciously turned his back 
on the more traditional common law view of a judge, i.e., one who “interprets” but 
does not “make” the law: “[j]udges ought to remember that their office is jus 
dicere, and not ‘jus dare’—to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law.”3 
 
 * Clinical Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I would like to thank two individuals who 
worked ceaselessly on this project and were of enormous help, Sidney Wright, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 
Class of 2019, and Amber Madole, one of Loyola’s tireless Research Librarians who found source material for 
this article time after time, and despite the persistent “rush” nature of my requests, invariably delivered the 
material to me with a smile. I also would like to thank Dan O’Gorman of Barry University, who allowed me to 
participate on the symposium panel discussing Judge Posner and Contract Law, and of course, my fascinating 
fellow panelists, whose different topics and approaches taught me much: Mike Malloy, from the University of 
the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; Debbie Gerhardt, from the University of North Carolina School of Law, 
Vic Goldberg, from the Columbia School of Law; and Jeff Harrison, from the University of Florida Levin College 
of the Law. 
         1.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING (2013) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS]; RICHARD 
A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008) [hereinafter THINK]; RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995) 
[hereinafter OVERCOMING]; and Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B. U. 
L. REV. 1049 (2006) [hereinafter Role]. 
2.  Adam Liptak, An Exit Interview with Richard Posner, Judicial Provocateur, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/us/politics/judge-richard-posner-retirement.html?mcubz=0 
[hereinafter Posner Interview] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
3.  RICHARD WHATELY, BACON’S ESSAYS WITH ANNOTATIONS 511 (3d ed. 1857). For others of long-
standing who took a similar view to Bacon, see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. 
Pole ed., 2005) (“The judiciary on the contrary has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction 
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be 
said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment . . .”), and 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,  
COMMENTARIES *69 (noting judges are “the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt, and who are 
bound by an oath to decide according to the law of the land”).  
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Judge Posner is a self-defined legal “pragmatist,”4 which he tells us is one who 
“bas[es] a judicial decision on the effects the decision is likely to have, rather than 
on the language of a statute or of a case, or more generally on a preexisting rule.”5 
This judicial “pragmatist” view of decision-making was perhaps even more aptly 
summarized by Professor Dworkin when he said, “The pragmatist thinks judges 
should always do the best they can for the future, in the circumstances, unchecked 
by any need to respect or secure consistency in principle with what other officials 
have done or will do.”6 
Indeed, Judge Posner has mocked any decisional philosophy that looks for 
inspiration in the dictates of traditional sources, such as statutes, the law, and 
precedent, rather than in clever and “sensible” resolution of the dispute before him. 
For example, in response to Chief Justice Roberts who enunciated the view that a 
judge should be an “umpire” who doesn’t “make the rules [but rather] app[lies] 
them,” 7  Judge Posner retorted that judges, in fact, create the rules: 
No serious person thinks that the rules that the judges in our system apply, 
particularly appellate judges and most particularly the Justices of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, are given to them the way the rules of baseball are given 
to umpires. The rules are created by the judges themselves. They are 
created out of materials that include constitutional and statutory language 
and previous cases, but these conventional materials of judicial decision 
making quickly run out when an interesting case arises; in those cases, the 
conventional materials may influence, but they do not determine, the 
outcome.8 
Given his predilection for installing a resolution of his own making rather than 
deferring to precedential supremacy, it is not surprising that Judge Posner sees 
 
4.  In an interview shortly after his retirement, Judge Posner said, “I am proud to have promoted a 
pragmatic approach to judging during my time on the Court . . .” Patricia Manson, Richard Posner Announces 
Retirement, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/archives/2017/09/01/re 
tirement-9-1-17 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). He has also said that the adjective 
“pragmatic” “seems to me the most descriptive of American appellate judges.” Role, supra note 1, at 1053. 
5.  See THINK, supra note 1, at 40. 
6.  RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 161 (1986). 
7.  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United 
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.). 
8.  Role, supra note 1, at 1051 (emphasis added). In another forum, he explained further his disagreement 
with Chief Justice Roberts’ “umpireal” view:  
Against Roberts’s umpireal analogy, therefore, I set the story of the three umpires asked to explain the 
epistemology of balls and strikes.  The first umpire explains that he calls them as they are, the second 
that he calls them as he sees them, and with the third that there are no balls or strikes until he calls 
them.  The first umpire is the legalist. The second umpire is the pragmatic trial judge . . . The third is 
the appellate judge deciding cases in the open area.  His activity is creation rather than discovery. 
THINK, supra note 1, at 81. 
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himself as much as a legislator as a judge; “judges in our system are legislators as 
well as adjudicators.”9 Indeed, as a “realist” he endorses the view that judges do 
“not draw a sharp line between law and policy, between judging and legislating, 
and between legal reasoning and common sense.”10 In continuing his disagreement 
with Chief Justice Roberts and those who look for the law to decide the case rather 
than the other way around, he says: 
But even legal thinkers who believe passionately that judges should be 
rules appliers and unbiased fact finders and nothing more do not believe 
that that’s how all or even most American judges behave all the time. Our 
judges have and exercise discretion. Especially if they are appellate 
judges, even intermediate ones, they are “occasional legislators.”11 
Judge Posner scolds those judges who do not acknowledge their legislative 
role. It is evident he considers that at best they lack self-awareness, and at worst, 
are liars: 
Judges tend not to be candid about how they decide cases. They like to say 
they just apply the law – given to them, not created by them – to the facts. 
They say this to deflect criticism and hostility on the part of losing parties 
and others who will be displeased with the result, and to reassure the other 
branches of government that they are not competing with them – that they 
are not legislating and thus encroaching on legislators’ prerogatives, or 
usurping executive-branch powers. They want to be thought of not as 
politicians in robes but as technicians, as experts.12 
Judge Posner also disapproves of judges who say they “do not legislate, do not 
exercise discretion other than in ministerial matters (such as scheduling), have no 
truck with policy, and do not look outside conventional legal texts—mainly 
statutes, constitutional provisions, and precedents (authoritative judicial 
decisions)—for guidance in deciding new cases.”13 Instead, he champions the view 
that traditional legal sources should not unduly obstruct his sensible or proper 
resolution of a case.14 
It is hard to argue a goal of achieving a “sensible resolution” of a dispute is not 
a judicial virtue, even if one might not view it as the central one. If Judge Posner 
had confined this philosophy to purely common law decision-making, it would not 
 
9.  THINK, supra note 1, at 118. 
10.  REFLECTIONS, supra note 1, at 120. 
11.  THINK, supra note 1, at 5. 
12.  REFLECTIONS, supra note 1, at 106. He has also written, “Judges’ belief that they don’t make law dulls 
their critical faculties.” Id. at 122.  
13.  THINK, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
14.   Posner Interview, supra note 2. 
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be as controversial for someone from the antimajoritarian branch to espouse it.  
After all, the common law was, by definition, developed decision-by-decision by 
different judges.15 As Professor Johnson observed, “common law questions give 
judges broad license to expand or contract ‘the law’ in countless ways.”16  In this 
regard, Judge Posner reminds us that “[t]he original precedent in a line of 
precedents could not have been based on precedent,”17 and that it is simply not 
possible for an ever-changing common law to have dealt with every case, policy, 
and exception before the next case surfaces. Previous case law sometimes fails to 
provide the answer to a new case and it is hard to argue with Judge Posner’s 
direction that the result in the new case be “sensible.”18 Judge Posner seems to 
recognize the fertile ground for the seeds of his philosophy in common law 
decision-making when he acknowledges, “[j]udges’ legislative power is usually 
thought to reach its zenith in common law fields.”19 
The question posed by this article, however, is whether Judge Posner’s result-
oriented philosophy changes at all when he confronts a question governed by a 
statutory scheme like the UCC. There, he is not dealing with common law’s tabula 
rasa, but rather with a legislative agenda with language and policies which the 
majoritarian branch of government has established.20 For some, the idea that 
statutory language acts as a constraint to what a judge might envision as a rational 
outcome of a case is easy: “There is no dispute that courts operate under different 
constraints and obligations when engaging [in] statutory versus common law 
questions. The core principle of statutory interpretation is ‘legislative 
supremacy.’”21 
The answer to the question posed in the preceding paragraph is that, 
sometimes, Judge Posner says the language of, and policies behind, a statute act as 
constraints on his judicial decision-making, making him more of a “constrained 
legislator,”22 than an unfettered one. For example, as a “legal realist” he has said 
he was “a ‘loose constructionist,’ which means he believes that interpretation 
 
15.  See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 103 (1949). 
16.  Nicholas J. Johnson, The Statutory UCC: Interpretative License and Duty Under Article 2, 61 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2012). 
17.  THINK, supra note 1, at 44. 
18.  A completely common law question with no previous case dealing with the issue is what Professor 
Calabresi had in mind when he said, “[T]here will remain situations in which courts can make law.” GUIDO 
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163 (1982). 
19.  THINK, supra note 1, at 82.   
20.  Obviously the UCC itself is not a statute passed by any legislature. However, it serves as the basis for 
the commercial codes of all states and some territories. When a case governed by Article 2 came before Judge 
Posner, it was, of course, decided under a commercial code of a state, which was passed by the relevant legislature. 
In the case which is the focus of the second part of this article, Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 
F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986), Judge Posner consistently cites to the UCC, even though the case was decided under 
the Wisconsin commercial code. Id. at 1288. Hence, when the UCC is referenced in this article, it will be treated 
as if it were “the law” and its drafters were “legislators.” 
21.  Johnson, supra note 16, at 1074. 
22.  Judge Posner called American appellate judges “constrained legislators.” Role, supra note 1, at 1055.  
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should be guided by a sense of the purpose of the text (contract, statute, regulation, 
constitutional provision) being interpreted, if the purpose is discernable . . . .”23  He 
has also said that, as a realist, he was guided by the purpose of the statute when the 
exact language of the statute was ambiguous, “if the statute is clear, fine; if it’s not 
clear, let’s try to figure out what the legislature’s general aim or thinking was and 
interpret the statute to advance that aim.”24 
But despite this “restrained” language, his writings make manifest that 
deference to the legislative scheme was not his highest value. He starts his defense 
of this philosophy by pointing out deficiencies in the legislative process that make 
discovering a legislative intent difficult: 
In the case of statutory provisions, common sense tells us to pay attention 
to the meaning of the words, certainly, and to the importance of 
distinguishing between what the provision means and what the judge 
would like it to mean and between what a provision says and what a 
legislator may have said it meant. But common sense also teaches us to be 
realistic about the legislative process – to understand the importance of 
compromise and the ambiguities that compromise frequently exacts, and 
to understand that legislators have a short horizon (the next election) and 
rarely try to anticipate and specify the entire range of possible applications 
of a statute, and that in light of possible applications of a statute, and that 
in light of that understanding the judicial duty is to devise interpretations 
that make sense.25 
Judge Posner does not fault legislators for ambiguous drafting and gaps in 
coverage. Indeed, in a sense of benign paterfamilias, he acknowledges the 
impossibility for a drafter to deal with all potential applications of the law, and 
tells us that to expect such omniscience: 
[W]ould place an unbearable information load on our legislatures. It would 
require them to be able to anticipate not only every quirky case that might 
arise to exploit ambiguities in statutory language but also every future 
 
23.  REFLECTIONS, supra note 1, at 120. He reiterated this idea elsewhere: “The realist tries to dispel 
ambiguity by digging beneath the semantic surface of the applicable rule for the practical considerations that 
motivated its adoption, and then by restating the rule in a modern idiom and with a clear indication of the rule’s 
limits as derived from its purpose.” Id. at 121. 
24.  REFLECTIONS, supra note 1, at 234–35. 
25.  Id. at 232. He described a similar sentiment:  
When legislative purpose (including the purposes behind constitutional provisions, a form of 
legislation) is discernable, the realist judge is an interpreter or perhaps a helper.  But often it is not 
discernable, and then the judge is the legislator and has to base decision on his conception of sound 
public policy within the limits the legislators have set.  And when that is the case the judge must, like 
other legislators, consider among other things the likely consequences of a decision one way or the 
other. 
Id. at 121. 
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change in society (such as the advent of the telephone or the Internet) that 
might make a statute or constitutional provision drafted without awareness 
of the change fail to achieve the provision’s aim.26 
With that foundation laid, he argues that there are legislative gaps in most, if 
not all, statutes, “There are too many vague statutes and even vaguer constitutional 
provisions, statutory gaps and inconsistencies, professedly discretionary domains, 
obsolete and conflicting precedents, and factual aporias.”27 But it is within those 
gaps that he justifies his propensity to ignore precedent and statutory policy to find 
a reasonable resolution of the case, just as with common law decision-making.  
Indeed, he calls judges “postenactment” legislators and touts their contribution to 
the legislative milieu: 
Loose construction, in contrast, shares out the information burden between 
legislators and judges. Vague constitutional and statutory provisions are . 
. . fine-tuned by the lower courts. Not only are more “legislators” brought 
into the picture, but the postenactment legislators  – the judges – contribute 
to the revisionary process information to which the original legislators, 
lacking the gift of prevision, had no access.28 
Eliminating any ambiguity on this issue, Judge Posner lauds those judges who 
treat ambiguous or gap-filled “statutes . . . with the same freedom as they treat 
common law precedents . . . .”29 He continues, “On the view I’m expounding, 
appellate judges when deciding cases in the open area are political actors – 
legislators operating under certain constraints that do not bind the official 
legislators, but also, depending on tenure and other factors, enjoying certain 
leeways that official legislators don’t.”30 
In finding the complete freedom to legislate when he finds a statutory 
ambiguity or a lack of clear statutory direction, Judge Posner is not only in 
disagreement with the originalists and the textualists.31 For example, Justice 
Kennedy has cautioned that, “[i]t is beyond our province to rescue Congress from 
its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think . . . is the preferred 
result.”32 Likewise Justice Thurgood Marshall once opined: 
But the fact that Congress might have acted with greater clarity or 
foresight does not give courts a carte blanche to redraft statutes in an effort 
 
26.  THINK, supra note 1, at 198. 
27.  Id. at 47. 
28.  Id. at 198–99. 
29.  Id. at 48. 
30.  Role, supra note 1, at 1054. 
31.  See, e.g., Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989) (quoting Justice Scalia, 
“Our task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it.”). 
32.  U.S. v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 68 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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to achieve that which Congress is perceived to have failed to do . . . Nor is 
the Judiciary licensed to attempt to soften the clear import of Congress’ 
chosen words whenever a court believes those words lead to a harsh 
result.33 
Even if we grant Judge Posner that when there are truly gaps in even a carefully 
drafted statute like the UCC, there is nothing more a judge can do but fill that gap 
with a reasonable decision under the circumstances,34 an issue remains. Namely, 
the same judge who has come up with a sensible resolution of the case is the one 
who decides whether the “gap” exists. And while one might expect that the natural 
order of things is for a judge to exhaust all normative means of deciding whether 
some sort of controlling statutory language, policy, or directive exists before 
declaring a “gap,” Judge Posner takes it the other way around: 
In suggesting that American appellate judges are constrained legislators, I 
do not embrace the view of H.L.A. Hart and others that judges legislate 
only after they have tried and failed to decide the case by reference to the 
orthodox legal materials of (mainly) text and precedent. No doubt many 
do proceed in this way, but many others reverse the sequence. They start 
by making the “legislative” judgment as to what decision would have good 
consequences – would be, in other words, good policy – and then see 
whether that judgment is blocked by the orthodox materials. Indeed, this 
corresponds better than Hart’s view to how judge’s think of their job . . . 
.35 
Judge Posner also tells us that the review of when his “legislative . . . 
judgment” is “blocked” does not often come up with a reason to defer imposition 
of his own solution to a case before him: “The next thing, he said, was to see if a 
 
33.  U.S. v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985). 
34.  There are, of course, many others who adopt the view of judges as “legislators” within statutory gaps, 
see, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 15, at 113 (“He [a judge] legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces 
of the law.”), and JULIUS STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW, LOGIC, JUSTICE AND SOCIAL CONTROL: 
A STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 500 (2d ed. 1950) (“[T]he principle . . . that where the law is silent or unclear the 
judge must decide the case as if he were a legislator, still sounds strange to us even after a century of demonstration 
. . . that this is what happens daily in our courts.”). 
35.  Role, supra note 1, at 1055. The quote above sounds a recurring theme in Justice Posner’s explanation 
in how he discovers legislative “gaps.” In another book, he notes: 
It might seem that judges would legislate only after they had tried and failed to decide a case by 
reference to the orthodox materials of legislative text and precedent. Some judges do proceed in that 
way. But others reverse the sequence. They start by making the legislative judgment, that is, by asking 
themselves what outcome—not just who wins and who loses, but what rule or standard or principle 
enunciated in their judicial opinion—would have the best consequences.  Only then do they consider 
whether that outcome is blocked by the orthodox materials of legal decision making, or, more 
precisely, whether the benefits of that outcome are offset by the costs that it would impose in impairing 
legalist values such as legal stability. . . . 
THINK, supra note 1, at 84. 
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recent Supreme Court precedent or some other legal obstacle stood in the way of 
ruling in favor of that sensible resolution. And the answer is that’s actually rarely 
the case . . . When you have a Supreme Court case or something similar, they’re 
often extremely easy to get around.”36 No wonder he says, “I pay very little 
attention to legal rules, statutes, [and] constitutional provisions . . . .”37 
Judge Posner lets us know that this ability and seniority allow him more 
discretion than is generally accorded a newer and less able judge to “find” a 
legislative gap and to use his power as a judicial-legislator to come up with a 
sensible solution to a case: 
A judge does not reach a point in a difficult case at which he says, “The 
law has run out and now I must do some legislating” . . . The amount of 
legislating that a judge does depends on the breadth of his “zone of 
reasonableness” – the area in which he has discretion to decide a case 
either way without disgracing himself. The zone varies from judiciary to 
judiciary and from judge to judge. Among institutional factors that 
influence the breadth of the zone is the judge’s rank in the judicial 
hierarchy. The higher it is, the greater his discretionary authority is likely, 
though not certain, to be.  
*  *  * 
A judge’s zone of reasonableness is likely to widen with experience, as he 
becomes more knowledgeable and more realistic about the judicial 
process. But I conjecture that it has a U-shaped relation to intellectual 
ability. Both the most able and the least able appellate judges are likely to 
stretch the zone – the most able because they will be quick to see, behind 
the general statement of the rule, the rule’s purpose and context, which 
limit the extent to which the general statement should control a new case; 
the least able because of the difficulty in understanding orthodox materials 
and a resulting susceptibility to emotional appeals by counsel, or, what is 
closely related, difficulty in grasping the abstract virtues of the systematic 
considerations that limit idiosyncratic judging, such as the value of the 
law’s being predictable.38 
 
36.  Posner Interview, supra note 2. 
37.  Id. This is not to say that Judge Posner never found precedent to “block” a differing judicial view, only 
that he did so infrequently and found ways around traditional constraints on decision-making easily. But for an 
example of when he applied such a constraint, see Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2012).  There, Judge 
Posner overturned an Illinois statute that, among other things, made it unlawful to carry certain guns in public, in 
large part based on D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 1035 (2007). This was after his sharp criticism of the decision, see 
REFLECTIONS supra note 1, at 186–96, which ended with his conclusion that, “Properly interpreted, the Second 
Amendment allows private ownership of guns only if required for militia duty.” Id. at 189. 
38.  THINK, supra note 1, at 85, 86–87. 
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Although the point hardly needs to be made any more clear, Judge Posner 
admits, “[T]he more experienced the judge, the more confidence he is apt to repose 
in his intuitive reactions.”39 
Judge Posner was aware that a judge who has a solution in mind could find 
legislative ambiguity where none exists to justify his or her decision: “Two things 
fatally undermined legal realism . . . The first was that the realists exaggerated the 
open area, sometimes implying that all cases are indeterminate.”40  However, he 
also gives us a clue why the attraction to find the gap is particularly strong: “The 
cases in which judges play a legislative role yield decisions that shape the law. 
They are not only the more important and most interesting cases but also the most 
challenging ones.”41  Again, he tells us that the more interesting the case, the more 
statutes are apt to be disregarded, “conventional materials of judicial decision 
making quickly run out when an interesting case arises; in those cases the 
conventional materials may influence, but they do not determine, the outcome.”42 
In fact, he defines “interesting cases” as “the ones in which the conventional 
materials of judicial decision making just won’t do the trick,”43 and tells us, “[t]he 
judicial mentality would be of little interest if judges did nothing more than apply 
clear rules of law created by legislators, administrative agencies, the framers of 
constitutions, and other extrajudicial sources.”44 
This risk that a gap will be easily found is compounded by the fact that rarely 
does a case get to the Seventh Circuit without there being some ambiguity in the 
law, a fact that not only Judge Posner realizes, but uses as justification for 
unleashing his “legislative” power. “Many appellate cases, one might even say the 
typical such case, involve a dispute over the scope or application of a rule . . . The 
scope or application is likely to be uncertain; otherwise the case would probably 
not have been brought, or if brought probably would not have reached the appellate 
level.”45 
Our symposium panel was formed to talk about Judge Posner’s contract law 
jurisprudence, and so it is fair to ask whether he has said anything special about 
how he approaches contracts cases. He has, emphasizing that decisions in contract 
law must favor stability and predictability: 
[T]he importance of stability in contract law is obvious and widely 
 
39.  Id. at 108. 
40.  Id. at 112. 
41.  REFLECTIONS, supra note 1, at 108. 
42.  Role, supra note 1, at 1051. 
43.  Id. at 1053. 
44.  THINK, supra note 1, at 5. 
45.  Id. at 245. Similarly, Judge Posner has noted, “Rarely is it effective advocacy to try and convince the 
judge that the case law compels them to rule in one’s favor. For if that were so, the case probably would not have 
gotten to the appellate stage  . . . .” Id. at 220, and “Legalist methods fail in many cases that reach appellate courts, 
and those are precisely the cases that most influence the further development of the law.” Id. at 47. 
 
2019 / An Explanation of Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters 
330 
recognized. Most contract rules are default rules, that is, rules the parties 
can contract around, so it is important that they know what the rules are so 
that can draft accordingly. Thus, another factor tending to narrow the zone 
is realization that legal stability is a paramount factor in some fields of 
law.46 
All of contract law is not based on the common law. The UCC is a mix of 
common law contracts principles and statutory dictates, and it poses special risks 
for those who interpret it. The risk of “gap-finding,” thereby opening up the license 
to insert one’s own resolution, is particularly strong when dealing with the UCC. 
As Professor Johnson notes: 
Contracts for the sale of goods implicate Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), and the UCC is decidedly statutory. It was 
conceived as a coherent system and adopted as public law by state 
legislatures. It is clearly contract law, which makes us think “common 
law.” And yet it is quite explicitly statutory. These dual impulses generate 
conflicting signals about the license and duty that governs the 
interpretation of Article 2. 
*  *  * 
[B]ecause of its fundamental grounding in common law contracts, Article 
2 especially tempts courts to stretch the license granted by the Code. It is 
as if courts are operating under a sort of common law inertia, a habit of 
mind that presumes the freedom to adjust, renovate, or flatly repudiate 
plain statutory commands if necessary, to generate “better” results . . . 
There are countless places where courts must weave alternately between 
the Code text and the common law and many cases where the text of the 
Code is a puzzle whose solution invites common law style analysis . . . 
[T]he Code’s general provisions explicitly invite judges to construe the 
text liberally to provide the flexibility necessary for administering rules of 
facilitation in a constantly changing marketplace. So the Code, more so 
than many statutes, anticipates and invites judicial creativity.47 
While the temptation may be strong to treat the UCC with the same flexibility 
as a common law decision, Professor Johnson warns of another risk when the 
legislative policy of the statute is too cavalierly disregarded: 
Resisting this inertia [towards treating the Code as common law decision-
making] imposes tedious cognitive demands, requiring judges to turn the 
statutory filter on and off as Article 2 questions oscillate between textual 
 
46.  Role, supra note 1, at 1066. 
47.  Johnson, supra note 16, at 1075–77. 
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commands and common law gap-filling. And while this might explain 
some counter-textural interpretations of Article 2, explanation is different 
from justification. Some cases are so blatantly at odds with the statutory 
text that one cannot escape the conclusion that courts have usurped the 
policy-making function of the legislature. These decisions fail to 
appreciate that the goals of the Code are not the only thing at stake; that 
the Code, like every statute, is a subpart of the broader constitutional and 
political arrangement between the branches of government reflecting their 
respective obligations to the people, and; that those arrangements generate 
institutional principles, and constitutional mandates that dictate far greater 
fidelity to the text than many courts have paid.48 
And against Judge Posner’s predilection to come up with a sensible solution 
by finding a gap and “forgetting” about the statutory interpretive restraints imposed 
by the regulatory scheme of the Code, Professor Johnson warns: 
[T]he question is whether this or any such invitation [to invite judges to 
construe the text of the UCC liberally] can justify interpretations that 
ignore the statutory text entirely and repudiate the political and 
constitutional principles that coalesce in separation of powers and 
legislative supremacy. These institutional principles define the core 
license and duty that constrains every judge who interprets any statute. 
They transcend concerns about particular results under particular 
statutes.49 
 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. at 1076. This is where Justice Cardozo parts ways with Judge Posner. As noted above in supra note 
34, Justice Cardozo acknowledges the role of a judge as a sometime legislator. But, he is much more limited on 
the latitude of judicial legislation than Judge Posner, even with the dual common law and statutory status of 
Article 2. Judges have, of course, the power, though not the right, to ignore the mandate of a statute, and render 
judgment in despite of it. They have the power, but not the right, to travel beyond the walls of the interstices, the 
bounds set to judicial innovation by precedent and custom. Nonetheless, by that abuse of power, they violate the 
law.  
If you ask him [a judge] how he is to know when one interest outweighs another, I can only answer 
that he must get his knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection; 
in brief, from life itself. Here, indeed, is the point of contact between the legislator’s work and his. 
The choice of methods, the appraisement of values, must in the end be guided by like considerations 
for the one as for the other. Each indeed is legislating within the limits of his competence. No doubt 
the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces of the 
law. How far he may go without travelling beyond the walls of the interstices cannot be staked out for 
him upon a chart. He must learn for himself as he gains the sense of fitness and proportion that comes 
with years of habitude in the practice of an art. Even within the gaps, restrictions not easy to define, 
but felt, however impalpable they may be, by every judge and lawyer, hedge and circumscribe his 
action. They are established by the traditions of the centuries, by the example of other judges, his 
predecessors and his colleagues, by the collective judgment of the profession, and by the duty of 
adherence to the pervading spirit of the law. 
CARDOZO, supra note 15, at 113–14 (emphasis added). 
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So, after all this analysis, how should we view Judge Posner when he decides 
commercial cases under the UCC – how should we view him as (with apologies to 
Professor Calabresi)50 a common law judge in the age of commercial statutes? His 
predisposition to legislate makes him a judicial-activist as he himself defines it, i.e. 
a judge who is engaged in, “enlarging judicial power at the expense of the power 
of the other branches of government.”51  He can feed that predisposition by finding 
“gaps” in the drafter’s work product, and he is encouraged to do so because he tells 
us those are the more interesting cases.  He can better “make his mark” on the law 
when he does not have to pay attention to the statutory and precedential restraints 
that constrain other judges and affect his “sensible solutions” to the cases before 
him. Because he is the one who decides whether a legislative gap exists, the urge 
to be fair and ignore (or overlook) the statutory scheme is great, especially when 
dealing with the mixture of common law questions and statutory limits in Article 
2. Indeed, perhaps I asked the wrong question to start this paragraph, for Judge 
Posner acts less as a common law judge, and more of a Chancellor in Equity, a 
“judge” who had no concern of precedent and instead simply sought equitable 
resolution of the cases before him.52  As Professor Morley tells us, “The Court of 
Chancery was not bound by strict notions of precedent; indeed, throughout 
Chancery’s early history, written rulings were not even published or widely 
available.”53  Indeed, it is not hard to imagine Judge Posner adopting a 
Chancellor’s mantle, as described by Justice Cardozo: 
Modern juristic thought, turning in upon itself, subjecting the judicial 
process to introspective scrutiny, may have given us a new terminology 
and a new emphasis. But in truth its method is not new. It is the method of 
the great chancellors, who without sacrificing uniformity and certainty 
built up the system of equity with constant appeal to the teachings of right 
reason and conscience. It is the method by which the common law has 
renewed its life at the hands of great masters – the method of Mansfield 
and Marshall and Kent and Holmes.54 
It is against this backdrop that we examine one of Judge Posner’s most famous 
Article 2 decisions, Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, along with 
Judge Easterbrook’s dissent.55 
 
50.  Cf. CALABRESI, supra note 18. 
51.  THINK, supra note 1, at 287. 
52.  See, e.g., Timothy S. Haskett, The Medieval English Court of Chancery, 14 LAW & HIST. REV. 245, 
268–69 (1996). 
53.  Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217, 228 (2018), citing John R. Kroger, 
Supreme Court Equity, 1789–1835 and the History of American Judging, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1425, 1435 (1998).  
54.  CARDOZO, supra note 15, at 137–38. 
55.  781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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II. THE WISCONSIN KNIFE WORKS CASE 
Wisconsin Knife Works (“Wisconsin”) was a subsidiary of Black & Decker56 
and a decision was made to have Wisconsin make spade bits for use in electric 
drills.57 A spade bit is an attachment for a drill which has a long shaft, a center tip, 
and cutting edges on either side.58 Spade bits are carved from something known as 
a spade bit blank, and Wisconsin found a supplier for these blanks in National 
Metal Crafters (“National”).59 
After some negotiation, Wisconsin sent a series of purchase orders to National 
for the spade bit blanks, each of which curiously had no delivery date, i.e., the 
delivery date line in the purchase orders were blank. Each purchase order also had 
an identical series of terms printed on the back.60 The preamble to the terms on the 
back provided, “Acceptance of this Order, either by acknowledgement or 
performance, constitutes an unqualified agreement to the following:” and one of 
those “following” terms was a special kind of “unilateral” no oral modification or 
“NOM” clause.61 It was unilateral because the clause prohibited the seller, 
National, from changing any agreement between the parties absent a writing signed 
Wisconsin, but it did not prohibit Wisconsin from single-handedly changing the 
contract.62 Indeed, another term on the back of the purchase orders provided that, 
“the Buyer [Wisconsin] shall have the right to make changes in the Order, by a 
notice, in writing, to the Seller [National].”63 
The first two purchase orders were sent by Wisconsin on the same day in 
September 1981, and National accepted them in a writing that provided, “Please 
accept this as our acknowledgement covering the above subject order.”64 The letter 
also contained a series of delivery dates that National believed it could meet.65 
Wisconsin thereafter “filled . . . in” the delivery date blanks in the purchase orders 
 
56.  Id. at 1283. 
57.  Id. 
58.  Spade Bit, FREE DICTIONARY, https://www.thefreedictionary.com/spade+bit (last visited Mar. 19, 
2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
59.  Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1283. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id.  
62.  Id. (“No modification of this contract, shall be binding upon Buyer unless made in writing and signed 
by Buyer’s authorized representative.”). 
63.  Id. A clause, which allows one party to modify an agreement without restriction upon simply notice to 
the other, might well render the “contract” illusory. However, an examination of the briefs reveals this issue was 
never raised in the appellate court, never discussed by Judge Posner, and not raised in the trial court briefs.  
Professor Murray raises a similar issue in his criticism of the decision. He poses the question of what would have 
happened had Wisconsin used (misused?) its ability to unilaterally change the agreement to increase the difficulty 
in making the spade bits, but then refused to accept new delivery dates caused by its changes. John E. Murray, 
Jr., The Modification Mystery: Section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1, 46 (1987). 
64.  Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1283. 
65.  Id. 
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with the dates suggested by National.66 
The other four purchase orders were also issued together, about a month later. 
National orally accepted these last four in a telephone call during which National 
also supplied (different) delivery dates for this series of orders.67 Once again, 
Wisconsin “wrote in” these orally-conveyed dates on the blanks for the delivery 
dates on the four purchase orders.68 When all was said and done, Wisconsin had 
ordered about 281,000 spade blanks, and National had promised their delivery in 
October and November of 1981.69 
National had trouble meeting the delivery dates it originally proposed.70 At 
first, it claimed that Wisconsin’s specifications were too hard for it to meet.71 
However, Wisconsin modified the specifications in light of National’s 
complaints.72 Those modifications apparently still did not do the trick, and 
National thereafter submitted a series of “pert charts”—charts that reexamined the 
entire process by which production and delivery of the spade blanks were to be 
made and delivered.73 The pert charts contained later, and in National’s view, more 
realistic, delivery dates for specified quantities of spade blanks covered by the six 
purchase orders.74 The pert charts were never signed by Wisconsin,75 although 
“people at Wisconsin Knife Works said that these dates and quantities were 
acceptable.”76 Because they were not signed by Wisconsin, however, the pert 
charts and their new delivery dates did not meet the test for an effective 
 
66.  Id. The idea that Wisconsin “filled in” the purchase orders with National’s delivery dates does not 
make literal sense. At the time of National’s acceptance letter, the original purchase orders were in National’s 
possession. Wisconsin couldn’t “fill them in.” Apparently, Wisconsin used National’s dates to fill in the blank 
dates of delivery on some copy of the purchase orders Wisconsin retained. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 18, Wis. 
Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1283 (No. 85-1801). However, there is no explanation as to 
how National became aware of that fact. It is perhaps best to think that Judge Posner was using shorthand to 
communicate that Wisconsin had accepted National’s delivery dates for the first two purchase orders as part of 
the deal, and communicated that in some way to National.  
67.  Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1283.   
68.  Id. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. 
71.  Id. at 1284. 
72.  Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1284. While not specifically saying so, Judge Posner strongly suggests 
that Wisconsin’s modifications lessened the burden on National and made it easier for National to meet its 
deadlines. Id. Whether they became binding on National because they constituted a mutual modification to the 
contracts, signed by Wisconsin, as required in the purchase orders, or became binding via Wisconsin’s ability to 
impose unilateral changes to the contract, is unclear. Id. 
73.  Margaret Rouse, PERT Chart (Program Evaluation Review Technique, TECHTARGET, 
http://searchsoftwarequality.techtarget.com/definition/PERT-chart (last visited Mar. 22, 2018) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“A PERT chart is a project management tool used to schedule, organize, 
and coordinate tasks within a project. PERT stands for Program Evaluation Review Technique, a methodology 
developed by the U.S. Navy in the 1950s to manage the Polaris submarine missile program.”). 
74.  Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1284. 
75.  Id. at 1284–85. 
76.  Id. at 1293 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). We are not told in the opinion what the delivery dates 
suggested in the pert charts were. 
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modification under the NOM clause. 
National did not supply spade blanks in any appreciable quantity until 
December 1982, over a year after it had promised to do so when it had first 
accepted the purchase orders.77 Shortly thereafter, in January 1983, Wisconsin 
notified National that the contract was terminated, due to what it claimed was 
National’s material breach. At that point, National had delivered some 144,000 of 
the total 281,000 spade blanks ordered.78 
Wisconsin brought suit in August 1985.79 National both answered and 
counterclaimed.80 In its answer, it claimed the original delivery dates it had 
provided (in writing for the first two purchase orders and orally for the latter four) 
were only suggested delivery dates, that the parties could and did change later on 
as part of the pert chart process. In its counterclaim, National sued for the breach 
of an oral promise it claimed Wisconsin had made to pay for certain expenses of 
maintaining certain machinery.81 
The trial court ruled that the exchange of purchase orders and the written and 
oral acceptances constituted contracts as a matter of law, but left to the jury the 
question whether the contract had been validly modified and, if so, whether it had 
been breached.82  The jury, apparently believing that the new delivery dates in the 
pert charts had validly modified the contract, and that National was in compliance 
with those modified dates, returned a defense verdict on the complaint, and 
awarded National $30,000 on its counterclaim for the machinery maintenance 
expenses.83 
Judge Posner decided, correctly, that resolution of the case depended on 
analysis of UCC § 2-209, the UCC’s provision on Modification, Rescission, and 
Waiver. Specifically, he decided that the case turned on the interpretation of UCC 
§ 2-209(4),84 the provision which deals with “waivers” of contractual terms. An 
examination of the briefs reveals that the possibility the case would turn on an 
analysis under UCC § 2-209(4) must have come as a surprise to the parties and 
their counsel, since neither cited to the provision in their Trial Briefs, and there 
was but one scant reference to the provision in the three appellate briefs filed in 
 
77.  Id. at 1283. It is interesting, if not necessarily significant, that in July 1982, about halfway through the 
period between November 1981 (when the first blanks were due) and December 1982 (when delivery of the 
blanks in appreciable quantities was back on track), Wisconsin sent purchase orders for even more blanks. Id. 
The July orders were subsequently rescinded by Wisconsin. Id. 
78.  Id. at 1283. 
79.  Docket Sheet at 1, Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-
1801). 
80.  Id. 
81.  The parties eventually stipulated that these maintenance costs were $30,000. Wis. Knife Works, 781 
F.2d at 1283. 
82.  Id. 
83.  Id. 
84.  U.C.C. § 2-209(4) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“Although an attempt at 
modification or rescission does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.”). 
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the Seventh Circuit.85 
Judge Posner built to his interpretation of UCC § 2-209(4), starting with an 
explanation of UCC § 2-209(1), which provides, “(1) An agreement modifying a 
contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding.”86 He explained 
that in UCC § 2-209(1), the UCC’s drafters had consciously chosen to exclude 
common law’s pre-existing duty rule from the UCC, and to allow enforceable 
modifications even without fresh consideration.87 Judge Posner applauds this 
innovation, explaining that requiring new consideration to enforce a modification 
is both overinclusive and underinclusive.88 It was the former because most parties 
performed modifications made without consideration anyway, and it was the latter 
because the common law only examined the existence, but not the adequacy of 
consideration, so a $1 payment could suffice as consideration for a multi-million 
dollar modification. 
Judge Posner went on to describe the benefits that common law’s requirement 
of new consideration provided. The first benefit was a new consideration element 
eliminated modifications made under duress. As an example, he cited the venerable 
case Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico89 where some sailors, about halfway 
through a trip from Alaska to San Francisco, threatened to mutiny unless they were 
paid extra. The owner of the vessel who was on board the ship agreed to pay the 
seamen what they demanded,90 but when they got to port, the owner withheld the 
modification payments. In the subsequent litigation, the modified payment term 
under the contract was held unenforceable because there was no new consideration 
to support its enforceability. Judge Posner told us, however, that despite 
elimination of the pre-existing duty rule, Alaska Packers would turn out the same 
way under the UCC because the principle of avoiding agreements made under 
duress was incorporated into the UCC under § 1-103(b).91 
The second benefit of the common law rule is that it solved the issue of the 
“bad faith” actor. He describes a situation in which the buyer of an idiosyncratic 
 
85.  Even that reference was devoid of analysis and very conclusory. At the end of a discussion on the 
meaning of “signed agreement,” Appellee’s brief stated, “Finally, it should be noted that Sec. 2:209(4) of the 
[UCC] provides that ‘although an attempt at modification . . . does not satisfy the requirements of (2), . . . it can 
operate as a waiver.’ In the case at bar, Wisconsin Knife Works’ conduct, at the very least, waived enforcement 
of the delivery dates.” Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 19, Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 
1280 (7th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1801). 
86.  U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). 
87.  Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir. 1986). The classic common 
law case establishing the requirement of consideration is Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605.   
88.  Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1285. 
89.  117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). 
90.   Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1902). 
91.  U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“Unless displaced by the particular 
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and 
the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, 
mistake, bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating cause supplement its provisions.”); Wis. Knife Works, 
781 F.2d at 1286. 
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good which requires special manufacturing tells the builder-seller that unless the 
seller agreed to a reduction in price, the buyer will put the seller to the expense of 
a lawsuit for the price by making up some reason to reject it. After attorneys’ fees, 
the time value of money, and the hassle of a lawsuit, the seller would be better off 
taking the offered reduced price. With common law’s requirement of new 
consideration necessary to support a modification, the seller could agree to the 
reduced price, and then successfully sue for the difference between the original 
and reduced price.92 Judge Posner concluded that the Code’s requirement of good 
faith93 could be used to achieve the same common law result with the “bad faith” 
actor.94 
The third benefit of common law’s requirement of consideration was 
evidentiary. That is, when one existing contracting party gives something of value 
to the other, probably a modification has taken place.95 Here, Judge Posner 
recognized that the drafters replaced the evidentiary benefits of common law’s new 
consideration requirement with UCC § 2-209(2) and (3),96 which require a writing 
to enforce a modification, either because there is a valid NOM clause (UCC § 2-
209(2))97 or because the contract as modified must satisfy the statute of frauds 
(UCC § 2-209(3).)98 
  Judge Posner spends little time discussing the effect of UCC § 2-209(3),99 
since the focus of the parties, and what he calls the “principal issue” of the case, 
was the enforceability of the NOM clause.100 
 
92.  Id. at 1285. 
93.  U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“‘Good faith,’ except as otherwise 
provided in Article 5, means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing.”); U.C.C. § 2-103(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“‘Good faith’ in the case of a 
merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the 
trade.”). 
94.  Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1286. 
95.  For example, in Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605, if Dr. Foakes gave free medical care to Ms. 
Beer for a year, there is at least some evidence that they modified their agreement. 
96.  Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1286. 
97.  U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“A signed agreement which excludes 
modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as 
between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by the other 
party.”). 
98.  U.C.C. § 2-209(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“The requirements of the statute of 
frauds section of this Article (Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its 
provisions.”). 
99.  There is a dispute among scholars as to whether that provision requires that there be a separate written 
agreement reflecting the modified agreement, or whether the original agreement can be used to satisfy the contract 
as modified. See, e.g., Beth A. Eisler, Modification of Sales Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code: 
Section 2-209 Reconsidered, 57 TENN. L. REV. 401, 421–30 (1990) [hereinafter 2-209 Reconsidered]. If the latter 
view were adopted, and the only provision regarding the enforceability of the modification was § 2-209(3), the 
trier of fact’s finding that the pert charts modified the agreement could have been upheld. 
100.  Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1283. 
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Judge Posner notes the common law did not favor such a clause.101  Indeed, 
the typical common law court viewed an attempted oral modification of a contract 
with a NOM clause as an implied waiver of the NOM clause by the parties, 
rendering the modification enforceable.102 However, he also noted that the drafters 
of the UCC specifically intended to validate such clauses.103  As such, he ruled that 
the NOM clauses were valid and binding on National.104  Since the new delivery 
dates in the pert charts were never agreed to in a signed writing by Wisconsin, any 
 
101.  Id. at 1286. 
102.  Id. Judge Posner cites Wagner v, Graziano Const. Co., 136 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1957) as support for such a 
proposition, along with its oft-quoted sentence, “The most ironclad written contract can always be cut into by the 
acetylene torch of parol modification supported by adequate proof.” Id. at 83–84. But he could have picked any 
number of cases that upheld oral modifications even in light of NOM clauses. See, e.g., Beatty v. Guggenheim 
Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 387–88 (N.Y. 1919) (“Those who make a contract may unmake it. The clause 
which forbids a change may be changed like any other. The prohibition of oral waiver may itself be waived . . . 
no limitation self-imposed can destroy their power to contract again”); Knight v. Gulf Refining Co., 311 Pa. 357, 
360 (1933) (“Parties may, by subsequent oral agreement, modify a written contract which they previously have 
entered into. The new contract thus agreed upon is a substitute for the original one in so far as it alters, modifies, 
or changes it”); Achenbach, v. Stoddard, 253 Pa. 338, 343 (1916) (“It is always competent for the parties to a 
written contract to show that it was subsequently abandoned in whole or in part, modified, changed, or a new one 
substituted. And this may be shown by parol, by showing either an express agreement or actions necessarily 
involving the alterations”); Prudden-Winslow Co. v. Stipp, 76 Pa. Super. 530, 532 (1921) (stating, in light of a 
NOM clause providing “no verbal understanding or agreement not contained in writing on the face of the order 
(and these conditions) shall be considered of any force whatever” that “[n]otwithstanding the written contract, the 
parties were still free agents. They could change it if they so desired”); Wiener v. Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique, 61 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir. 1932) (“Even a provision that there shall be no modification of an 
existing contract may be revoked by a new agreement between the parties which contradicts it”); Can. v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 411 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1969) (finding an oral modification of a written contract when there was 
detrimental reliance was permissible even though the contract contained a no-oral-modification clause); J.T. 
Majors & Son, Inc. v. Lippert Bros., Inc., 263 F.2d 650, 654 (10th Cir. 1958)  (“Such a [NOM] provision is valid 
but in the absence of the applicability of any statute of frauds it may be waived, modified, or rescinded by a 
subsequent oral contract.”); Bailey v. Norton, 178 Kan. 104, 108 (1955) (“[T]he terms of a written contract may 
be varied, modified, waived, annulled, or wholly set aside, by any subsequently executed contract, whether such 
subsequently executed contract be [oral or written]”); Freeman v. Stanbern Const. Co., 106 A.2d 50, 55 (Md. 
1954) (“[I]f the written contract provides that it shall not be varied except by an agreement in writing, it must 
appear that the parties understood that this clause was waived. However, such a clause may be waived by 
implication as well as by express agreement.”); Ogg v. Herman, 227 P. 476, 479 (Mont. 1924) (“The right of the 
parties to an executory contract to terminate it by mutual consent exists independently of any provision in the 
contract permitting them so to do[; and] [i]t is immaterial whether the termination be characterized as 
abandonment, cancellation, mutual rescission, or waiver.”); Barbo v. Norris, 245 P. 414, 417 (Wash. 1926) 
(recognizing binding “oral variance” after execution of written contract which “provides that no part of the 
contract can be sublet without the written consent” of the parties); Alexander Hamilton Inst. v. Hart, 192 N.W. 
481, 483 (Wis. 1923) (“An executory contract in writing may be rescinded by an oral contract, and such rescission 
may be by express agreement of the parties, or may be inferred from the acts of the parties.”). See generally Eisler, 
supra note 100, at 412, and 6 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, §§ 1294, 1295 (West Publishing Co. 
ed., 1962). 
103.  Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1286 (7th Cir. 1986). See also Valspar 
Refinish Inc. v. Gaylord’s Inc., 764 N.W.2d 359, 366 (Minn. 2009); South Hampton Co. v. Stinnes Corp., 733 
F.2d 1108, 1117–18 (5th Cir. 1984); U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449, 460 (E.D. 
Mich. 1972), aff’d, 509 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1975); 1 JAMES WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, UCC PRACTITIONER 
TREATISE SERIES § 2.39 (7th ed. 2016). 
104.  Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1285. 
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modification based on their submission by National was therefore unenforceable. 
Because the trial court left it to the jury to determine whether the agreement was 
validly modified, and the jury found that it was, the verdict could not stand.105 
What Judge Posner realized, even if the parties and the trial judge did not,106 
is that if an attempted modification is not enforceable due to its oral nature, there 
is another route to its enforceability under the Code, namely as a waiver under 
UCC § 2-209(4). That section provides, “Although an attempt at modification or 
rescission does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate 
as a waiver.” Thus, the real “principal issue” of the case was whether the attempted 
modifications via the pert charts, which were unenforceable as modifications 
because they were oral and did not meet the requirements of UCC § 2-209(2), 
could be enforced as waivers under UCC § 2-209(4). To answer this question, 
Judge Posner focused on the word “can” in UCC § 2-209(4) and reasoned that if 
some attempted modifications “can” act as waivers, then there must be some that 
cannot,107 and the search for the dividing line between the two is the fulcrum 
whereby Judge Posner metamorphizes into the “legislator” better described as 
Chancellor Posner. True to his announced jurisprudence, he first established what 
he saw as a “gap” in the legislative scheme that allowed him to interpose his own, 
sensible solution. He correctly noted there was no Wisconsin state case law 
discussing the issue of when an attempted modification can or cannot act as a 
waiver,108 and it is true that there is no UCC comment to UCC § 2-209 that directly 
answers the question of when attempted modifications can operate as a waiver. 
He then turns to the UCC drafters, and, as he has done previously, “excuses” 
them for not providing legislative guidance: “the draftsman were making a big 
break with the common law in subsections (1) and (2) and naturally failed to 
foresee all the ramifications of the break.”109  He then goes on to give examples of 
situations in which others have found direction of the UCC to be lacking: 
The innovations made in Article 9 of the UCC were so novel that the article 
had to be comprehensively revised only ten years after its promulgation. 
See Appendix II to the 1978 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. Article 2 was less innovative, but of course its draftsmanship was 
not flawless—what human product is? Just a few months ago we wrestled 
with the mysterious and apparently inadvertent omission of key words in 
the middle subsection of another section of Article 2. See Jason’s Foods, 
Inc. v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 774 F.2d 214 (7th Cir.1985) (section 2–
509(2)). Another case of gap-filling in Article 2 is discussed in White & 
 
105.  Id. 
106.  See supra text accompanying note 84. 
107.  Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1286–87. 
108.  Id. at 1288. 
109.  Id. at 1287. 
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Summers, supra, at 450 (section 2–316(3)(a)). But as a matter of fact, we 
need go no further than section 2–209(5) to illustrate the need for filling 
gaps in Article 2. In holding that that section allows the retraction of a 
waiver of the Statute of Frauds, the Third Circuit said in Double-E 
Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank, supra, 488 F.2d at 297 n. 7, “We 
have found it necessary to fill the interstices of the code,” because of “a 
drafting oversight.”110 
This paragraph provides scant support for the question whether there was a 
drafting oversight in UCC § 2-209(4) and the Code’s general approach concerning 
waivers that permits Judge Posner to insert his own “sensible” resolution. At best, 
the above paragraph stands for the proposition that some judges have recognized 
that other provisions of the Code did not provide sufficient guidance for a 
definitive interpretation. It says nothing, however, about whether the UCC’s 
scheme has neglected its duty to specify how UCC § 2-209(4) should operate. That 
is, just because some believed Article 9 needed to be reformed a decade after its 
passage does not mean UCC § 2-209(4) and the accompanying Code is bereft of 
direction. Similarly, the reference to Jason’s Foods111 does not provide any support 
for that proposition either. There, the question was over the meaning of the word 
“acknowledgement” in UCC § 2-509(2), where the risk of loss transfers to the 
buyer where goods are stored with a bailee and delivered without being moved 
upon “acknowledgement” by the bailee of the buyer’s right to the goods.112 Section 
2-509 did not specify who had to receive the notice, and Judge Posner, writing for 
the Seventh Circuit held that the bailee had to give notice of acknowledgement “to 
the buyer” (as opposed to the seller) in order to shift the risk of loss.113 Whether 
the case correctly found the need to add the words “to the buyer” after 
“acknowledgment” in UCC § 2-509(2) to have the provision operate sensibly in 
the real world does not mean that there was a similar justification to impose a new 
requirement under UCC § 2-209(4) to make a waiver enforceable. 
The arguments are similar for the White and Summers and Double-E 
 
110.  Id. at 1287–88. 
111.  Jason’s Foods, Inc. v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 774 F.2d 214, 214 (7th Cir. 1985). 
112.  Id. at 215.  
113.  Id. at 218–19. The case involved some frozen pork ribs stored at a warehouse where both the seller 
and buyer had accounts. The seller sold some of the ribs to the buyer and called the warehouse to tell it so. The 
warehouse acknowledged the transfer on the phone, and made an administrative adjustment that the ribs were 
now owned by the buyer. However, a few days passed before the warehouse got around to sending via snail mail 
the acknowledgement to the buyer that the transfer had been made. By the time the buyer got the 
acknowledgement, the warehouse had burned and the ribs destroyed. The seller sued for the price. Id. at 215. The 
court found that while the warehouse had “acknowledged” the transfer on the phone with the seller, and thus there 
was an “acknowledgment by the bailee of the buyer’s right to possession of the goods” as required by UCC § 2-
509(2)(b) to shift the risk of loss, such acknowledgement would not be effective until it was made to the buyer. 
An acknowledgement only to the seller also would be insufficient to trigger the transfer of the risk of loss. Id. at 
217–18. 
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Sportswear114 citations in the above quote. Whether there may have been a mistake 
in drafting in UCC § 2-316 or in UCC § 2-209(5) is irrelevant, except for the 
proposition that sometimes the drafters of a comprehensive code cannot foresee 
and provide for all possible future scenarios.115 But again it does not mean that one 
specific statute—UCC § 2-209(4)—and the general statutory approach of the Code 
do not provide directions on how to deal with waivers.  Double E dealt with the 
question of whether the parties could waive the effect of the statute of frauds when 
they made an oral modification of a UCC contract for the price of $500 or more. 
Neither the comments nor the Code answered either way, and so the court 
concluded that in the absence of anything prohibiting it, the term “waiver” in § 2-
209(5) should be interpreted broadly to include the waiver of the Statute.116 Double 
E could be viewed as an interpretation of what waiver encompasses in UCC § 2-
209(5), or, possibly as a case which “fill[ed in] the interstices of the code” by 
adding “including the Statute of Frauds” after waiver.117 Either way, the case does 
not provide a carte blanche to Judge Posner to  make his mark in interpreting UCC 
§ 2-209(4). 
However weakly supported, upon “establishing” his “gap,” Judge Posner 
marched in and announced his sensible resolution to the question of when an 
attempted modification “can” act as a waiver and when it cannot is . . . et voilà . . . 
“reliance.” That is, when the party benefitted by the unenforceable modification 
can show reliance on it, it “can” act as a waiver. If no reliance is shown, it cannot 
act as a waiver,118 explaining: 
 
114.  Double-E Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank, 488 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1973). 
115.  Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1291 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting) (acknowledging that “[r]epair work [on the Code] sometimes is necessary”). 
116.  Double-E Sportwear Corp., 488 F.2d at 297–98. 
117.  Id. at 297–98 n.7. 
118.  Judge Posner attempted to deflect the idea that linking waiver with reliance was entirely his idea: 
“[W]e find support for our proposed reconciliation of subsections (2) and (4) in the secondary literature.” See 
Beth A. Eisler, Oral Modification of Sales Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code: The Statute of Frauds 
Problem, 58 WASH. U. L. Q. 277, 298–302 (1980) [hereinafter Statute Problem]; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS § 7.6 (1982); CORBIN, supra note 103, § 211; See also Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1287. However, 
once again a careful examination of these sources reveals they do not provide the direct support for the enforce-
the-waiver-only-when-there-is-reliance position he claims. In the cited article, Professor Eisler advocates a 
complete change to UCC § 2-209 by reinstating the pre-existing duty rule under UCC §2-209(1): “At the outset, 
an oral agreement unsupported by consideration is unenforceable.” Statute Problem, supra note 120, at 300. She 
went on to opine that if there was no consideration to support the modification, the evidentiary purpose of the 
consideration requirement could be supplied by reliance. Id. at 300–01. That does not equate with an interpretation 
that a failed modification can be enforced as a waiver under UCC §2-209(4) and indeed, Professor Eisler clarified 
her position in a subsequent article, published after Wisconsin Knife Works was decided. See 2-209 Reconsidered, 
supra note 100. In the later article, she acknowledged there was no legislative “gap” on the waiver question and 
that Judge Easterbrook in dissent in Wisconsin Knife Works was correct in concluding the system of the Code 
affirmatively rejects the idea of linking reliance with waiver: 
I previously proposed an interpretation of subsections (3), (4), and (5) [to UCC § 2-209] concerning 
which I thought would dispel “some of the confusion concerning oral modification of written sales 
contracts.” Judge Posner agreed with my interpretation. Others did not. Now, like Professor Wormser, 
I have repented—at least with respect to some of my prior propositions. 
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Reliance, if reasonably induced and reasonable in extent, is a common 
substitute for consideration in making a promise legally enforceable, in 
part because it adds something in the way of credibility to the mere say-so 
of one party. The main purpose of forbidding oral modifications is to 
prevent the promisor from fabricating a modification that will let him 
escape his obligations under the contract; and the danger of successful 
fabrication is less if the promisor has actually incurred a cost, has relied.119 
So to recap, Judge Posner believes there are three advantages to the common 
law’s requirement of fresh consideration to enforce a modification: (1) to make 
unenforceable modifications made under duress; (2) to make unenforceable 
modifications made by the “bad faith” actor; and (3) to provide evidentiary support 
for attempted modifications which might be enforceable as “waivers” under UCC 
§ 2-209(4).  He says these issues are resolved in the UCC by: (1) the Code’s 
 
 Id. at 403–04 (internal citations omitted). In the end, she took the position that the drafters of the UCC should 
amend UCC § 2-209(4) to provide that if there was material reliance on the attempted modification, it should be 
enforced as equity demanded the other party be estopped from denying it. Id. But the point is, she recognized that 
the Code does not allow that now, and that it would require a change to link waiver and reliance. (Note her 
comment about Professor Wormser refers to the latter’s change of position as to the famous “Brooklyn Bridge” 
hypothetical he authored. Id.) Professor Farnsworth in the cited portion of his book does not state that reliance is 
necessary to establish an unenforceable modification, but rather that only when there is reliance should a NOM 
clause be given effect: 
A New York statute gives effect to provisions in written agreements that prohibit oral modification or  
termination and the Uniform Commercial Code follows New York in this respect. Under UCC § 2-
209(2), “A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing 
cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded . . . .” Such complete reversal of the common law rule 
would be severely tested in a case where one party had relied on the oral modification. The drafters 
therefore softened the reversal by adding that, “an attempt at modification or rescission . . . can operate 
as a waiver” even though it is not in writing as required by the clause, but “a waiver affecting an 
executory part of the contract” may be retracted “unless the retraction would be unjust in light of a 
material change of position in reliance on the waiver.” It would be possible to give an expansive term 
waiver in these provisions and thereby reach results similar to those reached in cases decided under 
the common law rule. The clause, then would only be effective if there had been no reliance. 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 120 (internal citations omitted; italics in original; underlining added). The above 
statement could be read as providing some support for an interpretation that using waiver as the vehicle for 
overriding an otherwise enforceable NOM clause, but Professor Farnsworth, like Professor Eisler, clarified his 
thinking in a later article in which he provided that Judge Posner’s position in Wisconsin Knife Works was 
“somewhat confused”:  
The expansion of the role of reliance, and the simultaneous erosion of the role of formalities, did not 
continue into the 1980s.  Indeed, with the notable but single exception of the somewhat confused 
Seventh Circuit case of Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, the trend appears in the 
other direction. 
E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980’s: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. L. REV. 203, 
219 (1990). Finally, Professor Corbin discusses waiver, reliance, and UCC §2-209(2) in the section cited, but it 
is not in a way that supports Judge Posner’s position. Professor Corbin laments the passage of UCC §2-209(2) as 
an infringement on freedom of contract, and discusses reliance and waiver as they appear in UCC §2-209(5). For 
another criticism of Judge Posner’s attempt to amass academic support for his linking of waiver and reliance in 
UCC §2-209(4), see Judge Easterbrook’s dissent in the case, Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1294 n.1. 
119.  Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1287. 
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incorporation of common law’s voidability of agreements entered into under 
duress in UCC § 1-103(b); (2) the Code’s good faith requirements in UCC §§ 1-
201(1) and 2-103(b); and (3) imposing a reliance requirement for enforceable 
waivers under UCC § 2-209(4). In the first two points, Judge Posner looked at the 
overall design of the Code and searched for a Code-based resolution of the issue. 
In the third, failed even to look for a solution provided by the Code, perhaps 
because he thought the linking of reliance and waiver “sensible.” However, that 
solution not only has no support in the UCC, but it actually is contrary to how the 
UCC directs that the issue of waiver be applied. 
The flaws in Judge Posner’s UCC analysis on this issue are largely pointed out 
in Judge Easterbrook’s dissent. There, Judge Easterbrook starts by noting that 
while the Code does not define “waiver,” it should not be given the well-known 
meaning of the term as: “the intentional relinquishment of a known right.”120 He 
then points out that such relinquishment of a right by a party has always been able 
to be shown by a writing, a conversation, or an action.121 In his majority decision, 
Judge Posner limits the establishment of a waiver to just the latter, and then to just 
reliance on the waiver by just one party—the party benefitted by the alleged 
modification.  Judge Easterbrook points out there is no justification under the Code 
or the case law for such a limited reading of how to prove the relinquishment of 
the right that is the subject of the waiver.122 
He goes on to discuss that under the benefit/detriment theory of consideration, 
there is some detrimental reliance necessarily shown by the promisee. But he then 
points out that it would be unusual for the UCC’s drafters to eliminate the 
requirement of consideration in UCC § 2-209(1), and the detriment that went with 
it, only to silently resurrect (or countenance the silent resurrection) of reliance in 
UCC § 2-209(4).123 
Further, Judge Easterbrook points out that Judge Posner’s linking of reliance 
with an enforceable waiver makes no sense when considered alongside the word 
“waiver” in UCC § 2-209(5), which provides: 
A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of the 
contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by the 
other party that strict performance will be required of any term waived, 
unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material change of 
 
120.  Id. at 1290 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
121.  Id.  
122.  Id. Indeed, he says, “So far as I can tell, no court has held that reliance is an essential element of 
waiver under §2-209(4). One has intimated that it is not essential. Double–E Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust 
Bank, 488 F.2d 292, 292–96 (3d Cir. 1973), citing 1 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209:8 (2d 
ed). The third edition of Anderson, like the second, states that reliance is unnecessary. Id. at § 2-209:42 (3d ed. 
1982).” 
123.  Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1290 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
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position in reliance on the waiver.124 
Judge Posner’s solution makes no sense in light of UCC § 2-209(5) for two 
reasons. First, because the drafters included the word “reliance” in § 2-209(5) 
within forty words of the end of UCC § 2-209(4), and it is highly unlikely they 
simply “overlooked” inclusion of “reliance” in UCC § 2-209(4) as a trigger for an 
enforceable waiver.125 It is more likely that the absence of reliance in UCC § 2-
209(4) was intentional. Moreover, if Judge Posner’s solution is correct, it would 
negate the effect of UCC § 2-209(5) altogether. That is, if an enforceable waiver 
is only found when there is reliance under UCC § 2-209(4), then UCC § 2-209(5)’s 
provision that a waiver can be retracted so long there was no reliance does not 
make sense. 
While not saying it directly, Judge Easterbrook chided Judge Posner for 
finding a “gap” as to the meaning of waiver where none existed: 
Section 2–209 of the UCC is not a slapdash production or the work of 
competing committees unaware of each other’s words, however. The UCC 
is one of the most carefully assembled statutes in American history. It was 
written under the guidance of a few people, all careful drafters, debated 
for a decade by the American Law Institute and committees of commercial 
practitioners, and adopted en bloc by the states. Vague and uncertain in 
places the Code is; no one could see all of the problems that would come 
within its terms, and in some cases foreseen problems were finessed rather 
than solved. But “waiver” did not call for finesses, and § 2–209 was 
drafted and discussed as a single unit. “Waiver” in § 2–209(4) and 
“waiver” in § 2–209(5) are six words apart, which is not so great a gap that 
the mind loses track of meaning. 
*  *  * 
The majority makes reliance an ingredient of waiver not because the 
structure of the UCC demands this reading, but because it believes that 
otherwise the UCC would not deal adequately with the threat of 
 
124.  U.C.C. § 2-209(5) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). 
125.  Judge Easterbrook explains this idea as follows: 
Vague and uncertain in places the Code is; no one could see all of the problems that would come 
within its terms, and in some cases foreseen problems were finessed rather than solved. But “waiver” 
did not call for finesses, and § 2–209 was drafted and discussed as a single unit. “Waiver” in § 2–
209(4) and “waiver” in § 2–209(5) are six words apart, which is not so great a gap that the mind loses 
track of meaning. The subsections read well together if waiver means “intentional relinquishment of 
a known right” in both. Section 2–209(4) says that a failed attempt at modification may be a waiver 
and so relinquish a legal entitlement (such as the entitlement to timely delivery); § 2–209(5) adds that 
a waiver cannot affect the executory portion of the contract (the time of future deliveries, for example) 
if the waiving party retracts, unless there is also detrimental reliance. 
Id. at 1291 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
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opportunistic conduct. The drafters of the UCC chose to deal with 
opportunism not through a strict reading of waiver, however, but through 
a statutory requirement of commercial good faith. See § 2–103 and 
comment 2 to § 2–209. The modification-only-in-writing clause has 
nothing to do with opportunism. A person who has his contracting partner 
over a barrel, and therefore is able to obtain a concession, can get the 
concession in writing. The writing will be the least of his worries. In 
almost all of the famous cases of modification the parties reduced the new 
agreement to writing.126 
One of the reasons Judge Posner restricted the enforceability of waivers to 
those instances where there was also provable reliance by the benefitted party was 
his fear that any breacher would claim an oral conversation took place during 
which the innocent party would be said to have agreed to whatever non-
performance from the original deal occurred, and claim a “waiver” of that term: 
“[w]e know that the draftmen of section 2–209 wanted to make it possible for 
parties to exclude oral modifications. They did not just want to give ‘modification’ 
another name—‘waiver.’ Our interpretation gives effect to this purpose.”127 But as 
Judge Easterbrook pointed out, the possibility of error in a particular case should 
not eliminate an entire class of defendants who entered into what they thought were 
enforceable oral modifications, but cannot prove reliance on the conversation. He 
noted that while testimony as to oral conversations were a permitted means of 
establishing a waiver under UCC § 2-209(4), it should not be assumed that finders 
of fact would believe such testimony in the absence of other proof, “It might be 
sensible to treat claims of oral waiver [without other proof] with suspicion . . . .”128 
But limiting the enforceability to just instances of reliance by the benefitted party 
would also foreclose waivers in another entire class of cases where the actions of 
the parties were just as telling as reliance by the benefitted party, namely cases in 
which there is a course of performance shown by the burdened party which 
evidences a waiver: 
[A juror might] insist on waiver by course of performance—for example, 
accepting belated deliveries without protest, or issuing new orders (or 
changing the specifications of old orders) while existing ones are in 
default. Waiver implied from performance is less prone to manipulation. 
This method of protecting modification-only-in-writing clauses gives 
waiver the same meaning throughout the statute.129 
By finding a gap in the Code, which allows him to fashion a solution linking 
 
126.  Id. at 1292 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
127.  Id. at 1288. 
128.  Id. at 1292 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
129.  Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1292 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
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waiver with reliance in UCC § 2-209(4), Judge Posner also ignores one of his own 
dictates, namely that commercial law should be predictable and stable. In 
remanding the decision to discover if there was evidence of National’s reliance on 
the different delivery dates in the pert charts, Judge Posner asked the parties to 
reexamine their conduct in light of a rule that did not exist as they were exchanging 
purchase orders and pert charts.130 So far from enhancing stability and 
predictability, at least as between these parties and allowing them to know “the 
default rules” so they can draft and act “accordingly,” this decision inserted a new 
and unknowable test which only proscriptively judged their behavior.  It is of 
course true that any new test which might foster commercial stability in the future 
has to be implemented in a case which could catch the parties’ unaware, but one 
would think that a hallmark for a judge with a “pragmatic” and “sensible” 
jurisprudential view would be a test that could be applied to the normative conduct 
of the parties even in the absence of the unknown (and unknowable) rule after the 
decision was made. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Although I certainly have a viewpoint on the proper resolution of the “waiver” 
issue, the purpose of this article is not to decide which judge had the best reading 
of UCC § 2-209(4). Academic commentary since the case has been decided has 
been mixed, but more on Judge Easterbrook’s side than not.131 Since Wisconsin 
Knife Works, there has been but one major decision on the issue, and that favored 
the Easterbrook position as well.132 The reason the issue has not shown up much is 
likely that the ease of text, email, and other electronic written forms of 
communication has made the decision, like telephone calls attempting to modify 
contracts, obsolete. 
However, the point of our symposium is to give some insight into how Judge 
Posner decided commercial law cases. A rush to find “gaps” that allow him to 
come up with a “sensible” resolution of the issue before him by acting as a 
 
130.  Id. at 1288. 
131.  Compare FARNSWORTH, supra note 120 (arguing Judge Posner’s reasoning overlooks 
the possibility that the word waiver was used, as it is often in contract law, to refer only to the excuse 
of conditions as distinguished from the discharge of duties. It would have been perfectly consistent 
with recognized principles of contract law to have applied subsection (4) as written, without the 
court’s gloss, requiring no reliance for a waiver of the condition of the buyer’s duty that the seller 
deliver on the specified dates. This would not have affected the seller’s duty to deliver on those dates 
and would have left the seller liable in damages for its failure to do so.), and Murray, Jr., supra note 
63 (criticizing the majority’s decision), with JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2–7 (6th ed. 2010) (indicating support for the decision). 
132.  BMC Industries, Inc. v. Barth Industries, Inc., 160 F.3d 1322, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998) (rejecting 
Judge Posner’s interpretation of 2-209 and agreeing with Judge Easterbrook’s assertion that “reading a 
detrimental reliance requirement into the UCC would eliminate the distinction between subsections (4) and 
(5)).” However, the Seventh Circuit continues to follow Judge Posner’s opinion. See, e.g., Cloud Corp. v. 
Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2003); Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Bill Kummer, Inc., 65 F.3d 1381, 1386 
(7th Cir. 1995). There is a Fourth Circuit decision that does so as well, albeit in an unpublished decision, 
Flowers Ginning Co. v. Arma, Inc., 106 F.3d 390, 1997 WL 26573 (4th Cir. 1997).  
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legislator and modern day Chancellor is part of that legacy. 
 
* * *
